Learning from the Frontline

Lieutenant General Andrew Graham shares the valuable lessons he has been able to take from the battlefield to the boardroom (this article was first published in Diversity MBA Magazine).

I have recently enjoyed sessions with the MBA students at Judge Business School at Cambridge University examining the relevance and applicability of military leadership practice and command for business, especially in demanding times. Those sessions persuaded me that if the principle of “do what you always did and you get what you always got” holds true (and it surely does), there is a risk of truly strategic negative consequences if there is not a significant adjustment to how politicians and business people think about and tackle the issues facing them and us.

Although I have been a soldier for 36 years, my contention is not that adopting military or frontline practice is a silver bullet. However, it may be relevant in an era when the political, commercial, economic, and security/defence environment is so fast-moving, complex, multi-faceted, and unpredictable that it requires fly-by-wire decision-making, direction and control from those charged with leading their organizations to succeed. My proposition is that since the notion, principles and practice of command, together with an approach to being prepared to be surprised, are being tested daily on the frontline, some of the ideas may be relevant for business and businesspeople to ponder.

The notion of command is unfamiliar territory for most in business and civil life, yet is intrinsic to the military profession. Command is not about shouting orders, telling people what to do and then leaving them to it. Command both encompasses and adds an extra dimension to the trinity of leadership, management and technical/professional competence and expertise.
Whatever the level of responsibility in the Army, whether on or off the frontline, at home or abroad, every commander has three responsibilities: to make decisions, to take responsibility for the execution of those decisions, and to lead those around him (and by extension the organization he/she commands) in order to achieve the outcomes stated in those decisions.

Effective command decisions set a direction of travel for the organization and thus instill clarity of focus, a sense of purpose and a feeling of shared enterprise. The British military decisionmaking mechanism ensures that all relevant factors are evaluated in the creation of the operational plan; that intent, priorities, and unity of purpose are communicated through the organization; and that value, in the form of detail, is added at the appropriate level. The process demands the involvement of the commander at every stage and derives its effectiveness from the interaction between the commander, who is the decision-maker, and the experts and specialist branches of the staff and subordinates.

To be effective, decisions must be relevant to the situation. In his autobiographical account of the World War II Burma Campaign, then-General Bill Slim recounts taking command of the Burma Corps shortly after the defeat on the Sittang River, with the fall of Rangoon to the Japanese imminent. His summary of the shortcomings of his new command relative to its ability to prevail in the environment and against the enemy is concise, acute, factual and honest. It would have been difficult for his superiors, immediate staff and subordinates to read his account. Slim knew, as all experienced soldiers, the AAA-rated value of a clear, perceptive, high level but simple and unvarnished analysis of the situation in which he found himself — the real situation both internal and external and not a rose-tinted picture of the situation as he might have hoped, planned, intended, or wished it to be. Without that analysis the start-point for effective planning would have been flawed and the chances of balancing the available means (men, materiel, potential allies, other resources) with the achievement of the intended outcome (defeating the Japanese in Burma) through the ingenious manipulation of the ways (tactics, optimizing resupply, alliances, raising morale, etc) would be at best diminished, and at worst, still-born.